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threat of international war. This is becoming increasingly true of other important regions 
of the world, such as the European Union, Southern Africa, and the former Soviet states, 
where major interstate war seems unlikely. Moreover explaining more cooperative 
foreign policies, the priority of economic wealth generation in domestic affairs, and the 
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A. ARGUMENT OF THE THESIS  
1. Purpose and Importance 
The purpose of the thesis is to find out how prolonged peace affects the politics 
and national goals of countries. Peace has become one of the major study areas in both 
international and domestic politics. Some scholars like Charles Tilly find a strong 
correlation between war making and state capacity of the developed countries. However, 
what is the relationship between peace and state capacity in developing countries that 
lack external threats? 
Finding out the effects of regional peace on Brazilian contemporary politics is 
valuable when trying to understand the course of international relations while there is an 
absence of a clear threat of international war. This is becoming increasingly true of other 
important regions of the world, such as the European Union, Southern Africa, and the 
former Soviet states, where major interstate war seems unlikely. Moreover, explaining 
more cooperative foreign policies, the priority of having economic wealth generation 
within domestic affairs, and the institutional changes within the military, will be helpful 
when trying to build a comparative perspective to understand countries that will be 
experiencing similar environments. 
2. Hypothesis 
My hypothesis is that the peaceful environment, or the absence of high external 
threats, has affected the state, society, military, and individual leaders in Brazil. How 
does the international peace or the absence of a clear external threat in South America 
affect Brazil’s achievement of national goals? I hypothesize that the absence of a serious 
external threat in the region pushed Brazil to become more cooperative in the 
international realm, to prioritize economic development, and to institutionalize 
accordingly. Brazil’s national goal of greatness in world politics could not be pursued 
vigorously due to the lack of the necessary conditions for successful strategies within the 
region. 
2 
My analyses will examine the state capacity and development of Brazil in 
comparison with other developing countries. I will try to match the national goals and 
policy objectives of Brazil with the outcome of domestic and foreign policies influenced 
by the level of the external threats in the environment. 
3. Methodology  
The effects of regional peace on the politics of a country, specifically Brazil, will 
be examined within the three levels of analysis: systemic, domestic, and institutional. The 
comparison of the military rule between 1964 and 1985 and the civilian regime after 1985 
will be the focus of this thesis which is intended to extract the impacts of peace or the 
mere absence of high external threats.  
The introductory chapter will discuss the theoretical review of basic concepts 
such as “zone of peace” arguments and Latin American peace at the system level, 
national security strategies and threat perceptions at the domestic level, diplomacy used 
as a foreign policy tool for advancing national interests in a systemic perspective, and the 
domestic implications of peace and civil-military relations will be conceptualized in this 
chapter. 
Following the same methodology, chapters two and three will analyze Latin 
American security environment, military and elite threat perceptions, national security 
strategies, use of diplomacy in foreign policies, and civil-military relations in the given 
periods. The second chapter examines 21 years of military regime through the perceptual 
threats and political responses to these threats. The third chapter discusses the democratic 
transition and civilian authority through the primacy of economic and social development 
strategies under the obvious lack of external threats. 
In the concluding chapter, the impact of peace through a comparison of politics 
within the military regime and civilian governments will be assessed. Three aspects will 
be analyzed within Brazil on the systemic and domestic levels; threat perceptions and 
national security strategies, diplomacy in foreign policies, and civil-military relations in 
domestic politics. The final chapter will also focus on Brazil’s regional and global roles 
in the future in terms of military and defense strategies. 
 
3 
B. ZONE OF PEACE AND SOUTH AMERICAN PEACE  
1. Interstate Peace and Zone of Peace 
Prolonged peace is the starting point of my thesis; therefore, it is necessary to 
define it as the main variable of my analysis. The definitions and the typologies of peace 
set the conditional factors for the causal relationship between a peaceful environment and 
state capacity through state policies. 
The definition of international war and peace may vary according to some 
dimensions such as strength, time span, geographical scope, or the nature of threats. In 
the literature we find definitions such as “zones of war”, “no-war zones”, and “zones of 
peace” in respect to geographical places, or as “cold war,” “hot war,” or “cold peace” in 
respect to the intensity and quality of the interstate relations. 
War zones are defined as regions where there is high occurrence of actual 
interstate wars. In no-war zones, militarized conflicts are frequent, military capabilities 
are targeted toward specified enemies, and alliances and arms races may be prominent 
features of the diplomatic and strategic landscape. Never the less, war does not result 
from these processes. However in zones of peace, militarized conflicts may break out too, 
but capabilities are not targeted toward members of the region and war becomes 
unthinkable in bilateral relations.1 
Kacowicz’s definition states, “a zone of peace is a discrete geographical region of 
the world in which a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among 
themselves for a period of at least thirty years, a generation, though civil wars, domestic 
unrest, and violence might still occur within their borders, as well as international 
conflicts and crises between them.”2 Kacowicz divides the peace patterns into three 
types. The first type is “negative peace”, or the mere absence of war. The second type of 
peace is “stable peace”, that is, no expectations of interstate violence in the region. The 
third type is a “pluralistic security community of nations”, in which member states share 
common norms and are deeply interdependent. 
                                                 
1 Kalevi J.Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 147. 
2 Arie M. Kacowicz, Zones of Peace In The Third World: South America and West Africa In 
Comparative Perspective (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 12. 
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M. Arie Kacowicz, in his prominent book about zones of peace in the Third 
World, argues that to achieve a substantive, more stable peace within a region, two 
conditions must exist: satisfaction with the territorial status quo and a shared norm for 
peaceful settlement of international conflicts. To move beyond a stable peace toward a 
pluralistic security community, high levels of interdependence and economic integration 
among the states and the people with a sense of regional identity are necessary 
conditions.3 
2. South American Peace 
David Mares articulates the existence of “violent peace” in Latin America, 
opposed to the “zone of peace” assessments of authors like Arie Kacowicz and Holsti. 
According to his perspective, international affairs are all about bargaining situations 
between rational actors. Latin America is not an exception to this reality. In contrast to 
the widespread perception of having prolonged peace, Mares finds the historical record of 
“militarized interstate disputes” in the region, including conflicts with less than 1000 
casualties, enough to change the peaceful outlook of Latin America. The potential 
militarized disputes among countries, which are not yet satisfied with their territorial 
status quos, are given as indicators of interstate competition. He proposes the “interstate 
militarized bargaining model” against the actual cooperative intentions of state actors, 
where the decision-makers “weigh the costs of militarized conflict against their 
constituents’ willingness to accept the costs.”4 Although refuting the “democratic peace” 
arguments, Mares argues that the main reason for decision makers to use or not use the 
military force in interstate relations is the constituent affect on their authorities. However, 
he also makes the argument that the military regimes of 1960s and 1970s did not use 
military forces despite their autonomy from the constituents. 
With the records of militarized crises, targeted military forces, diplomatic 
ruptures, and overall military competitiveness, South America clearly is not yet a zone of 
peace. It has been a no-war zone in which the probabilities of armed conflict are 
                                                 
3 Kacowicz 1998,.24. 
4 David R. Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America (Colombia 
University Press, New York, 2001), 3. 
5 
substantially lower than many other regions of the world today.5 Within South America, 
since 1903, there have only been two wars: the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay 
(1932-1935) and the war between Ecuador and Peru (1995). A war is defined only if 
there are more than 1,000 casualties.6 The twentieth century map of South America 
displays no major change in the territories. In the region, especially after the Second 
World War, most of the states accept the territorial status quo and share a normative 
consensus.7 
South America is now moving from a negative zone of peace toward a more 
stable one. Even authors who focus on militarized disputes among states in Latin 
America, such as David Mares, would probably acknowledge that the region is 
characterized by the absence of major regional wars in the twentieth century. This thesis 
will focus on Brazil, the most important regional actor, yet a country which has not 
fought a war with its neighbors in 135 years and whose troops have not served in combat 
since they fought with the Allies in World War II. 
C. PERCEPTUAL THREATS AND BRAZIL’S PERCEPTIONS 
1. Threat Perceptions and National Security Strategies 
The definition of threat that will be used as a variable in the thesis is the systemic 
threat on the interstate level that is posed to the state and the society. Under all 
circumstances, a threat is something conditional, potential, or hypothetical, and the threat 
perception comes from the assessment of past, present, and future vulnerabilities of the 
state and the society. While all perception is ultimately the act of individuals, threat 
perception as a task of statecraft takes place in collective groups, especially in 
organizations.8  
If a state actor feels threatened, he anticipates the loss of something of value, such 
as territory, population, sovereignty, economic assets, and political constitution. The 
threatening action may appear alongside military violence as economic, ideological, or 
                                                 
5 Holsti 1996, 154. 
6 Ibid., 151. 
7 Ibid., 9-10. 
8 Ibid., 114. 
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politically subversive. Even though the source of threat is not real or tangible, the act of 
threat perception creates an image of reality. The changing nature of international 
relations and the inadequacy of information about the future may be the downside of 
these perceptual threats.9 Moreover, threat perception can become stereotyped as a result 
of historical experience. 
Misperception is a common dimension of threat perception, which can be either 
deliberate or erroneous. Deliberate misperception is like a manufactured or purposive 
evaluation of a nonexistent threat designed to justify and excuse some policies, which 
require the existence of a threat. However, the erroneous threat perception, which tends to 
exaggerate or miscalculate the intensions and realities, in most cases is more common 
than the previous one.10 
The political outcome of the threat perception of policy makers in a state frames 
the national security strategy. National security is an elastic and flexible term that can be 
stretched to cover different issues and activities over time. Basically, it is protecting the 
territory and the people of a nation against external and internal physical assaults which is 
narrowly equivalent to defense.11 
National security refers to the condition of a nation's safety from internal and 
external threats. A greater emphasis is put on external threats to ensure the protection of 
vital economic and political interests. The survival and safety of the nation-state is 
possible throughout the use of economic and military power and the exercise of 
diplomacy in both peace and war. Moreover, the foreign policy and domestic policies 
have some overlapping spheres with national security policies of the states. 
2. Threat Perception in Brazil 
The ruling elite in Brazil, during the military regime, relied heavily on 
geopolitical thinking when assessing the potential threats to national security. In a very 
generic term, the external threat perceptions have been limited to border and territorial 
                                                 
9 Klaus Eugen Knorr, Historical dimensions of national security problems (University Press of 
Kansas, 1976), 84. 
10 Ibid., 120. 
11 Jordan Amos, William J. Taylor Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, American National Security: Policy and 
Process, 4th ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 3. 
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disputes.12 Therefore, the examination of the geopolitical thinking of the leaders is 
essential in gaining a better understanding of the threat perceptions in Brazil especially 
during the military regime. 
Philip Kelly and Jack Child define geopolitics as the impact of geographic 
features on foreign and security policies.13 Jack Child emphasizes the importance of 
geopolitics in Brazilian history and the region. During 1960s and 1980s, geopolitical 
strategic perspectives had dominated the region, where Brazil had played a leading role in 
this kind of thinking. This mindset dominated national security attitudes and foreign 
policy objectives for years. 
The Brazilian geopolitical school was without a doubt the most significant 
in Latin America. This is true not only because of its impact on 
contemporary Brazil, but also because it has served as a model for others 
and has produced strongly reactive geopolitical thinking14 
In respect to the geopolitical considerations, Brazil is a dominant power in South 
America and the South Atlantic. It has common borders with all South American states 
except Chile and Ecuador. Its maritime frontier extends to Africa, and it is the fifth 
largest country in the world. Its population is larger than the rest of South America 
combined. With all these aspects in mind, the leaders of Brazil have always believed that 
Brazil is a potential rising world power. 
The era of democratization, after authoritarian Brazil, witnessed the priority of 
economic and social development in the minds of ruling elites. Communism as a 
subversive ideology, Soviet intervention or US interference to Brazilian sovereignty, and 
even the long lasting rivalry with Argentina were no longer a threat to the civilians. 
Economic crises, social inequality, organizational crime, penetration of the Amazon 
Region, and economic dependency have become the issues of national security in the 
1990s. 
 
                                                 
12 G. Pope Atkins, Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System (Westview Press, 
Texas, 1999), 62. 
13 Philip Kelly and Jack Child, Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica  (Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, Colorado, 1988), 2. 
14 Ibid., 34. 
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D. FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS AND DIPLOMACY IN BRAZIL 
1. Tools of Statecraft in Foreign Affairs 
Another variable of analysis is the policy outcomes of the peaceful environment 
in Brazil. Therefore, it is meaningful to define the major influence strategies of foreign 
policy. The tools of international interaction can be multiple and diverse according to the 
state actor and the international context. However, we can identify some typologies for 
the main instruments of statecraft: diplomacy, economic instruments, information 
programs, clandestine actions, threats of force, and use of force.15 Among these 
strategies, I will focus on diplomatic and economic instruments as the primary means of 
statecraft. 
Diplomacy is the primary and the most common form of interstate relations, 
which also has variations in itself such as cooperative, mediating, or coercive diplomacy.  
Diplomacy involves negotiations, settlement of disputes, representation, and social 
functions. If we analyze the foreign policies of a state within two major procedural 
stages, the making and the implementation of policy, diplomacy is used as an instrument 
through which decisions are implemented, policy activated and achieved.16 
Economic instruments are also functional as they have become the key factor in 
today’s globalized world with high interdependence among state actors. It is mainly 
referred as the carrot and stick phenomenon in politics such as economic sanctions and 
positive incentives. 
Information programs are also gaining importance as the global communication 
instruments are reaching every corner of the world. It is sometimes perceived as the 
power of propaganda through public information, namely the media. However, 
clandestine actions, which include espionage, subversion, sabotage, or assassination in 
some extreme cases, are often risky for the doer. Sometimes it is referred to the last resort 
other than war when diplomacy or economic instruments, as well as information 
                                                 
15 R. Allan Ricketts and Richard J. Norton, National security (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College 
Press, 1994), 42. 
16 Brian White “Diplomacy,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International 
Relations, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford University Press, 2001) 123. 
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programs, do not work. Similarly, the threat of force is not an ordinary way to deal with 
sovereign states and it is only used when the risk of escalation is present. 
The final instrument that we can easily identify is the oldest way of obtaining 
national interests which is the use of force. It is perceived as the last resort or the ultimate 
form of state instruments to deal with an international issue affecting the country’s 
national security. However, it is not only deteriorating for democracy and human rights, 
but also distressing in terms of economic calculations. 
2. Brazilian Diplomacy and Foreign Relations 
Brazil has always been well known for its successful diplomatic legacy. Rather 
than relying on military dominance in international relations, Brazil prefers to use 
diplomacy, which is safer and more cost-effective in most cases. While analyzing the 
foreign policy of Brazil since 1964, it is necessary to mention Brazil’s reputation for 
using diplomacy extensively in interstate relations. 
Brazil used diplomacy, negotiation, and bargaining methods more in its bilateral 
foreign relations, especially with its neighbor Argentina, and in multilateral issues in the 
region. It is fair to say that Brazil, in favor of mediation and negotiation, has developed a 
diplomatic culture based on the peaceful resolution of disputes.17 
Although geopolitical thinking had limited the external threat perceptions to 
border security and territorial disputes in authoritarian Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s, 
diplomacy was still the main policy tool. The military mind has been replaced gradually 
with domestic, economic, and social prerogatives in the contemporary strategic guidance 
of Brazil as a developing country.18 Pope Atkins stresses that since WWII, in most Latin 
American countries, national security has been synonymous with national development, 
where the new agendas are democratization, economic reforms, civil-mil relations, and 
regional integration.19 
 
                                                 
17 Wayne A. Selcher, “Current Dynamics and Future Prospects of Brazil’s Relations with Latin 
America: Toward a Pattern of Bilateral Cooperation,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 
Vol. 28, No. 2 (1986), 70 
18 Atkins 1999, 63. 
19 Ibid., 53. 
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E. DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS OF PEACE 
1. Impacts of External Threat and Peace 
Tilly finds a strong relationship between war making and state building as seen in 
his famous statement: “war makes states and states make war.”20 Charles Tilly’s 
argument on war and state relationship, mainly examining the European cases, concludes 
that war-making efforts, due to the existence of external threats, increased states’ scope 
and cohesion. For Tilly, the lack of external threats might undermine the state capacity of 
the developing countries. 
In addition to the war and state arguments, with the rise of democratic civil-
military relations literature, scholars began to examine the impacts of the external threat 
environment on domestic politics. Desch argues that external threats improve political 
control of the armed forces. He claims that existence of external threats draws the 
attention of civilians to the armed forces and therefore facilitates civilian control of the 
military.21 Nevertheless, another situation is also possible: the existence of significant 
threats to the national security can make the armed forces a privileged institution, and 
raise their domestic significance and influence. 
There are arguments about the impact of change in domestic politics on 
international relations of countries such as transition to democracy and the end of military 
regimes. However, they should be analyzed in both ways to understand the affects of the 
changing international realm on individual countries. Domestic affairs affect the 
international relations, whereas the international environment influences the domestic 
realm. 
A peaceful international environment, or the absence of a concrete external threat, 
will have impacts on the society, state, military and the individual leaders in a democratic 
environment. The society has the power of electing governments and, in most cases, has 
power through what it thinks. The state institutions and state bureaucracy will also reflect 
their preferences in the absence of external security concerns, where they will focus on 
                                                 
20 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, 
ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169. 
21 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1999), 13-14. 
11 
other issues such as human rights, democratization, etc. Moreover, the individual actors, 
especially those who contribute to the decision making process, are affected by the 
international threat perceptions of the country. The elected leaders and government 
officials may prioritize economic and social development, while they lack the expertise in 
security issues. The peaceful international context will be reflected in national security 
strategies and threat perceptions and will have positive effects on democratization 
process as public participation in politics, economic development, and social welfare. 
However, it is also argued that the absence of external war might adversely affect 
the military as an institution in a democracy. The argument is that the lack of tangible 
external security concerns will push the military into an internal role that does not always 
favor democracy, therefore pushing civil-military relations into a new composition.22 
2. Civil-Military Relations 
The main indicator of the relation between the external threat environment and the 
domestic realm is the state of civil-military relations (CMR) of a country under a 
democratic regime. Today, civilian control of the military, namely military compliance 
with government authority, is one of the basics of democratic rule. Civilian control is 
measured by the authority of the government officials to make decisions concerning the 
military, e.g., missions, organization, and employment, and state policies, free from 
military interference. 
Civil-military relations are defined as “the entire range of relationships between 
the military and society at every level”23 My analysis will focus on the causal relationship 
between the external threat environment and the reflections in the civil military relations 
mainly in the political-military dimension. The security environment and the threat 
scenario, missions and tasks of the military, social forces and ideologies, and the power 
relations among the political institutions are the subject terms of our CMR analysis of 
Brazil. 
The basic causal relationship between the threat environment and CMR can be 
summarized in Desch’s argument. Michael Desch examines the civilian control of the 
                                                 
22 Desch 1999, 13. 
23 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review Political Science (1999, 2): 211. 
12 
armed forces in democracies and defines CMR in terms of the relative distribution of 
power between the government and the armed forces of a country He illustrates the 
impacts of the threat environments on the level of CMR of countries: “the lack of a 
serious external threat leads to deteriorating CMR.”24 Charles Moskos, in his book about 
modern militaries in the changing international threat environment, also gives the logic 
behind the domestic and foreign policies of countries.25 He points out that the military 
should focus on the external threat and tasks, because internal tasks may deteriorate the 
political impartiality of the military. This is very important for the legitimacy of military 
in the society. 
The traditional role of the military is to be ready for an external threat, and 
Brazilian military tried to increase its power through a developed defense industry and 
assuring the primacy of national security issues in state politics. However, the civilians 
who want the priority to be economic welfare rather than unlikely security threats are 
now questioning the security concerns of the military mind in Brazil Moreover, the 
internal missions and tasks of the military have increased in Brazil, in the last half of the 
twentieth century. The argument is that the prolonged peace over a hundred years made 
the military engage in internal affairs. However, recently, Brazilian military has 
employed and supported foreign policy through peaceful deployments abroad, such as 
peacekeeping. 
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II. MILITARY RULE (1964-1985) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on the Brazilian military regime from 1964 to 1985, in 
order to examine the implications of prolonged peace on Brazilian politics in the system 
and domestic levels of analysis. The chapter focuses on four main parts during these 20 
years of military governments. In the first part, the focus will be on the security 
environment within Latin America, and the “armed peace” argument will be discussed. 
The existing threat and security environment for the region, particularly for Brazil, and 
the historical background for the authoritarian regime in Brazil during the period of 1964-
85 will be examined at the system level of analysis. In the second part, the military threat 
perceptions and national security strategy will be focused on in addition to the 
environment in the domestic level. The rivalry with Argentina and the threat of 
communist subversion are the main threats for the military leaders during this period. In 
the third part, the foreign policies of the military governments between 1964 and 1985 
will be examined, especially through diplomatic relations abroad. Finally, in the fourth 
part of the chapter, the domestic implications of external peace will be analyzed, where 
the evolution of civil-military relations is taken as the major indicator of domestic 
politics. The roles for Brazilian military driven by the threat perception will also be 
discussed in this chapter. 
B. LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY IN 
AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL 
In terms of total international wars since 1816, the start date for quantitative 
studies of war, Latin America is not exceptionally peaceful. Latin America and 
specifically the Southern Cone, before the twentieth century, was a region of conflict. 
However, for South America, the twentieth century has been an era of relative peace, 
when compared to the record of war in the nineteenth-century.26 
Grabendorff states that there had been 23 internal conflicts in Latin America 
between 1945 and 1976, which refutes the existence of an inherent peace in domestic 
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terms.27 However, there have been no wars of secession, and within the interstate level, 
there has been no wars between South American states since 1941. Since 1903, there has 
been two wars in South America: the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932–
1935), and the war between Ecuador and Peru in 1941. Moreover, most of the conflicts 
which broke out in this region during the twentieth century were limited in time and 
diplomatic action was instituted as much as force. South America has been the most 
peaceful area in the world in the twentieth century. Other areas of the world have been 
scenes of more or less chronic warfare and armed intervention. 28 
In South America, during the authoritarian military regimes of the 1960s and 
1970s, one of the main reasons for the lack of interstate conflict was due to the internal 
orientation of threat perceptions. The military governments formulated doctrines of 
national security, relying upon anticommunist stereotypes of the Cold War, and they 
adjusted the doctrine to their own realities and purposes. The national security and 
foreign policy thinking of the military regimes were mistrustful and competitive in 
nature. In North America and Europe, theoreticians of national security stressed total war 
and nuclear weapons strategy and focused on the use of limited warfare. In contrast, their 
South American counterparts emphasized the threats of internal subversion and 
revolutionary warfare.29 
1. Security Environment for Authoritarian Brazil 
The Cold War period affected the external environments of countries throughout 
the world. Countries were heavily influenced by the bipolar conflict between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. However, despite the ideological challenges in its internal 
politics, Brazil was largely unaffected by external threats from the Soviet Union and the 
United States. The likelihood of any interstate-armed conflict was very low and regional 
integration and security cooperation were becoming an increasing trend. 
The real security environment around Brazil, similar to other countries in South 
America, was lacking a serious, tangible, external threat during the authoritarian rule of 
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1964-85. Communism and the nuclear rivalry with Argentina were the major external 
sources of insecurity; these factors were in fact of less priority when compared to the 
economic development of the country. Brazil has enjoyed generally good relations with 
its neighbors, except the rivalry with Argentina up to the mid-1980s. The politically 
inspired terrorism of the late 1960s and 1970s was the only organized internal 
insurgency, which was less severe than its equivalents in other states. The pacific security 
environment for Brazil became more obvious with the disarmament negotiations to end 
the chronic rivalry with Argentina in early 1980s. The economic boom during the mid 
1970s and reduction of the defense budget were clear indicators of how the military 
governments were shifting their focus to areas other than the traditional security 
concerns. 
2. Military Legacy and the Preconditions of 1964 
In almost 500 years of its existence, Brazil has not experienced a high frequency 
of armed conflicts. For the last 135 years, Brazil has not been involved in an interstate 
conflict in the region. This rare historical legacy of prolonged peace has enhanced the 
evolution of a peace-oriented defense mentality in Brazil and kept the armed forces 
relatively small.30 
Brazil has participated in three international wars since its independence from 
Portugal in 1822. The first conflict occurred in the early 1850s in the Rio de la Plata 
basin, the site of a long-time rivalry among Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil.31 
The second war was against Paraguay and allies Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay for five 
years between 1865 and 1870. In the aftermath of the war, the territory that Brazil and 
Argentina had gained control of became the subject of their rivalry for regional power 
and influence. The third international war Brazilians participated in was WWII. Under an 
agreement reached between the United States government and Getulio Vargas, Brazil 
sent an expeditionary force to Italy in July 1944.32 
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The Brazilian armed forces have developed in response to different external 
threats in history. The army was strengthened during the Dutch invasions of the 
seventeenth century. The Brazilian Navy flourished during the war of independence in 
the nineteenth century. Finally, the air force was founded during the Second World 
War.33 Through professional military education under the guidance of German and 
French professionals, the military became more involved in politics in Brazil, especially 
after 1930. 
The social, economic, and ideological problems that were present in many parts of 
the world during the 1960s involved Brazil as well. The military had intervened into 
politics five times since 1930 and served as a moderator instead of taking direct military 
control. However, in 1964, the military assumed governance to the full extent. As Alfred 
Stepan has noted, “the military became the director and not the moderator of politics. 
Instead of maintaining the status quo, the military sought to transform the system.”34 
With a large popular support, Janio Quadros became the president of Brazil in 
1960. Quadros initiated negotiations with the Soviet Union and other communist bloc 
nations. These negotiations increased Soviet influence within Brazil and greatly 
displeased the United States. Moreover, Quadros’ new tax plan also disturbed the 
businessmen and conservative elites in Brazil. After only eight months of presidency, the 
military forced him to resign.35 
Quadros’ vice-president, Joao Goulart, assumed the presidency after him despite 
opposition from the military. During his presidency, Goulart supported some land 
reforms and tried to restrict the money flow going out of Brazil. He also extended 
suffrage to include illiterates and allowed communists to participate in Brazilian politics. 
The disapproval of wealthy landowners, industrialists, and the external pressure from the 
U.S. led to Brazilian military intervention within the political scene and the eventual 
overthrow of Goulart’s government in 1964.36 
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3. Military Governments 
The Brazilian Generals seized power with promises to reinforce the threatened 
democratic institutions and eliminate the danger of subversion and communism. Soon 
after they took power, using the “National Security Doctrine” as an ideological blueprint, 
the military reshaped governmental structures and created new organizations that 
emphasized central planning and control over the entire state administration. Institutional 
Act No.1, right after the coup, centralized political authority, eliminated parliamentary 
immunity, and launched inquiries into suspected individuals.37 
From 1964 to 1985, the military dominated the regime in Brazil. The presidents 
and the governors were imposed by the armed forces, where a submissive Congress was 
forced to approve them. The first president with a military background was Humberto 
Castelo Branco (1964-67). Branco did not want to undermine the constitutional order and 
intended to stay in power for a short time to maintain the necessary security. However, 
his term was extended for one year with extra decrees and the hard-liners within the 
military were able to secure the continuation of the authoritarian rule despite Branco’s 
initial commitments.38 
A power struggle took place within the military from the very beginning of the 
military governance. In late 1965 and early 1966, the moderate faction represented by 
General Castelo Branco lost their influence over the hard-line officers clustered around 
the Minister of Army Arthur da Costa e Silva. The pro-ESG members of the military, the 
so-called Sorbonnists, were politically moderate and wanted to maintain democratic 
forms and institutions. Presidents Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Geisel (1974-79) best 
represented this faction. In contrast, the hard-liners within the military favored 
suspension of democratic processes and were more nationalistic. They argued against a 
high degree of foreign political and economic dependence in attaining the goals of 
security and development. The hard-liners were hesitant to return political power to 
civilians. Presidents Costa e Silva (1967-69) and Medici (1969-74) best represented this 
faction within the military.39 
                                                 
37 Skidmore 1988, 8. 
38 Ibid., 18. 
39 Ibid., 105. 
18 
After Castelo’s term, Artur da Costa e Silva (1967-69) assumed the presidency 
supported by the hard-liners within the military. However, he died unexpectedly in 1969 
before his term ended. The officer corps elected Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1969-74). 
Like Costa e Silva, Medici was also supporting the hard-line measures and holding the 
authority as long as it was necessary to make Brazil a great power. The Medici years 
witnessed increasing insurgency within cities, which included the kidnappings of 
diplomats and ambassadors. 
Ernesto Geisel (1974-79) was the next general to be the president in authoritarian 
Brazil. Geisel signaled the first steps of relaxation from authoritarian rule in Brazil. 
Finally, the last president of the military regime was Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo 
(1979-85). He claimed that he took over the presidency more out of a sense of duty than 
political ambition. Political liberalization and the declining world economy contributed to 
Brazil's economic and social problems. In 1978 and 1980, huge strikes took place in the 
industrial ring around Sao Paulo.40 The democratic transition became almost inevitable 
for Brazil in the early 1980s and the authoritarian regime initiated the negotiations to 
resign the 20-year military rule. In the bargaining process with the civilians, the military 
tried to maintain its autonomy and power sources such as intelligence, control of the 
defense industry, and constitutional mission to protect the state. 
C.  THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
Miguel Angel Centeno argues that most Latin American countries have lacked the 
influence of an external enemy that would have encouraged the development and 
solidification of a national identity. The enemy was perceived not as the nation next door, 
but as those in the population who threatened the social and economic status quo. Except 
some stereotype concerns about the neighboring countries, which were all probabilistic, 
and not imminent, the military regime did not deal with external threats as an important 
issue throughout their time of control.41 
The Brazilian military in the 1960s and 1970s was both internally and externally 
oriented, during this period the threat perceptions of the military regime regarding the 
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external environment were mainly derived from the teachings of the Brazilian War 
College Escola Superior de Guerra. ESG was established in 1949, and in 1963, its charter 
decreed its mission as, “preparing civilians and military to perform executive and 
advisory functions especially in those organs responsible for the formulation, 
development, planning, and execution of the politics of national security.”42 The 
geopolitical security thinking and the interrelationships between national security and 
national development were the dominant ideology of the ESG in 1960s. The generals 
began developing ideas that stressed the possibility of an “indirect attack” from the 
Soviet Union such as subversion.43 In accordance with the military strategists, the 
military governments emphasized the external sources trying to penetrate Brazil and they 
followed more of internally oriented political pattern. 
External threat perception of the military governments could be seen in the 
military journals of that time. In December 1975, the navy minister, Azevedo Henning 
emphasized the dangers of Soviet military expansionism in the South Atlantic. In 1976, 
an article in the Brazilian Army War College’s journal discussed two types of threats: 
“ideological penetration via diplomatic and commercial means in peace time and the 
transformation of countries in Brazil’s strategic realm such as Angola into a communist 
state will be disadvantageous for Brazil in war time.”44 Alfred Stepan takes the military 
periodicals as one of the main sources of his evaluation of the military doctrine in 
authoritarian Brazil, where he finds a doctrinal change between 1974 and 1981. Political 
participation, opposition, and elections for the civil society began to be considered more a 
part of national security.45 
1. Argentine Rivalry 
For the military regime, one of the greatest concerns about external threats was 
the aggressiveness of Argentina towards Brazil. The perceptions regarding the Argentine 
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aim to isolate Brazil had originated from the very end of the colonial period and had been 
remarkably consistent. Brazil declared war on Argentina over the territory of present day 
Uruguay in 1825 and the control of the Rio de la Plata had become the source of the 
conflict between Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay from 1825 to 1851. They waged wars 
almost continuously to control this economically important area.46 
The threat perception of the military about Argentina was constant throughout the 
1960s and 1970s. The rivalry reached to the highest level in the late 1970s when both 
countries decided to acquire nuclear technology. Argentina’s agreement with India for 
nuclear programs increased the threat perceptions in Brazil. Brazil then signed an 
agreement with West Germany to produce nuclear reactors in 1975, this agreement 
eventually ended up as being secret nuclear programs conducted by the military.47 
3. National Security and Defense Under Military Threat Perception 
The military regime was guided by a national security doctrine consisting of two 
major elements. The first was a broad definition of security, which included not only the 
defense against external aggression, but also the internal defense against insurgencies and 
communism. The second component of the national security doctrine was economic 
development. The importance of economic development and industrialization as the key 
aspects to sovereignty and independence were strongly advocated by the strategists. Their 
intent was to promote the integration and the protection of national territory.48 
Developing the country’s vast uninhabited Amazon region with people and markets was 
of vital importance as well. 
Geopolitical concerns led to the formulation of a national security strategy. 
Brazilian geopolitical thinking dictated that the country was threatened to be isolated by 
its Spanish-American neighbors. Military leaders emphasized the importance of Latin 
America in the World and touted Brazil as being the most important country in the 
region. According to military thinking, the geopolitical importance of Brazil should give 
Brazil greater bargaining power with world powers, especially the United States. 
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Moreover, the maintenance of Brazilian maritime capabilities and communications with 
other continents were vital for survival.49 
The generals of that time described the current international world order as a 
situation of “permanent war”. As a result, the distinction between where peace ends and 
war begins was not very clear. In this setting, enemies of Brazil would rely upon “internal 
subversion”, which military theoreticians defined as a conflict inspired, stimulated, and 
aided externally. One of their conclusions from the assessments of the international and 
domestic conditions of Brazil, as a developing country, was Brazil’s need to achieve 
internal security as the main part of its national security strategy.50 
D. FOREIGN POLICY AND USE OF DIPLOMACY 
When the military took over the government, they did not change the overarching 
foreign relations of Brazil. They followed foreign policies in accordance with the 
permanent national goals of Brazil, such as becoming a respected member of the 
international system. Moreover, the military governments extended the peaceful tradition 
of international affairs within Brazil and focused on the social and economic 
development of the country. In the past, Brazil had sought opportunities to be involved in 
world politics in WWI and WWII aligning itself with the Allies and continued not to be 
an isolationist nation during the military regime.51 
The major policy instrument used in foreign relations was political diplomacy. 
This was done to prevent potential crises from escalating to war. Brazil used diplomacy 
extensively throughout the 1970s to keep favorable political relations with neighboring 
countries and to prevent the formation of an anti-Brazilian alliance. The isolating 
intentions of her Spanish-speaking neighbors and the image of Brazil as being a surrogate 
of the United States, motivated Brazil to depend on diplomatic bargaining and 
negotiations. 
Brazil’s rapid economic growth during the late 1960s and early 1970s gave the 
military regime considerable domestic and international legitimacy. In the early and mid-
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1970s, Brazil turned its attention away from hemispheric affairs toward a global view of 
its economic interests. Brazil shifted its foreign policy to meet its economic needs and 
started to follow a philosophy of “responsible pragmatism” especially after 1970. 
"Responsible pragmatism" replaced strict alignment with the United States and an 
ideological and bloc based worldview. An automatic alignment with U.S. was no longer 
the trend in Brazilian foreign policy calculations. With more flexibility, pragmatism, and 
independence in foreign policies, Brazil increased relations with Africa and oil producing 
countries in the Middle East. In 1977, South Africa became the major export country for 
Brazil, and later relations with Angola and Mozambique emphasized the importance of 
South Atlantic relations. Moreover, being heavily dependent on imported oil aligned 
Brazil with Iraq and Arab countries in the Middle East.52 
1. U.S. Relations 
The military regime was overtly supported by the United States, which was very 
concerned about communist subversion. As the military regime adopted policies that the 
United States favored, Washington showed its appreciation. Between 1964 and 1968, 
Brazil received more than $1.5 billion in military and economic aid from U.S.53 By the 
end of the 1960s, domestic opinion in Brazil and world rejection of the US role in 
Vietnam helped weaken Brazilian-U.S. relations. At this point, Brazil began to pursue its 
own interests. During the Geisel administration (1974-79), Brazil shifted from a pro-
Israeli stance to a closer relationship with oil-rich Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This was done 
because Brazil imported 80 percent of its oil. This relationship also allowed Brazil to 
build stronger ties with Spanish America, Europe, and Japan. Abraham Lowenthal cites 
the Brazilian challenges to US such as ignoring the US-inspired grain embargo imposed 
on the Soviet Union in 1980, contradicting US approach in UN by condemning Zionism 
and accepting Palestine Liberation Organization as a legitimate representative in UN, 
being the first non-communist nation to recognize Angola in 1974, and having conflicting 
economic concerns.54 
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Brazil’s 1975 agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
to build nuclear reactors led to confrontation with the Carter administration in U.S. The 
United States was also scolding the Geisel administration in Brazil for the human rights 
abuses, as the international and domestic alertness about the issue had increased. Because 
of mutual distancing policies, Brazil renounced its Military Assistance Agreement with 
the United States in 1977.55 During the Malvinas Crisis (1982), Brazil immediately 
recognized Argentine sovereignty over the archipelago with a South American regionalist 
commitment. This assertiveness against the U.S. gave the perception to neighboring 
countries in the region that Brazil was not as strong a U.S. ally as they had thought.56 
However, Brazil still felt the need to keep the bilateral relationships with the United 
States, and continued to consider U.S. perspectives when formulating its foreign 
policies.57 
2. Inter-American Relations 
In a general perspective, Brazil and the rest of the continent seemed to share 
socio-economic and cultural similarities, which helped to support close and cooperative 
relationships within the region. However, historically, despite its geographical location, 
Brazil’s self-identification as a Latin American nation has not developed like the 
outsiders’ perception of Latin America as a whole. The Portuguese heritage and culture, 
the immensity of the country, and being away from Spanish American population centers 
impeded Brazilian integration with her Spanish-speaking neighbors.58 
Brazil’s relations with Latin America during the 1970s were strained by 
ideological differences. The nuclear rivalry with Argentina, Brazil’s rapid economic 
growth and the concerns of its neighbors that Brazil was a U.S. proxy or an expansionist 
power hindered close relations in the region. Moreover, increased relations with Western 
Europe, Japan, Africa, and the Middle East aftermath of the economic boom in 1970s 
undermined the practical role of Inter-American relations in Brazil’s foreign policies. The 
military government believed that the regional multilateral obligations would hinder 
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Brazilian national freedom of action, especially during an era of expanding its 
influence.59 
However, when the economic progress ended in the late 1970s, Brazil followed 
closer relations in the region. The consensus grew in Brazil that its national development 
could not be planned or achieved separate from Latin American context. The major 
change in Brazilian Interamerican policies began during the presidency of Joao 
Figueiredo (1979-1985) who emphasized the need to avoid anti-Brazilian alliances 
among Latin American countries. In turn, Brazil, without political inhibitions and with 
the encouragement of its partners, started to expand and enforce its presence in the 
Southern Cone.60 On the other hand, the instability of Central America lessened the 
attractiveness of this region for Brazil.61 
Brazil sought increased relations in the region, and the nuclear competition with 
Argentina in late 1970s was the major problem for Brazil. Brazil’s tensions with 
Argentina began to subside towards the end of the 1970s. The evolution of Brazilian-
Argentine relations from rivalry to cooperation in nuclear disarmament had been the 
milestone of Brazil’s relations with Latin America. In 1979, the Itapúa-Corpus friction 
with Argentina was negotiated with mutual satisfaction. Five years before the first 
democratic regime in Brazil, cooperative attitudes between Brazil and Argentina and 
other regional partners deepened in 1980.62 President Figueiredo was the first Brazilian 
President ever to visit Bogotá, Lima, and Caracas, and the first to visit Buenos Aires in 
45 years.63 Additionally, Brazil and Argentina signed the Foz de Iguazú Declaration, 
which restricts both nations to the development of nuclear power for non-military 
purposes, two months before Brazil’s transition to democracy in January 1985. 
E. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The implications of the peaceful international environment on the domestic realm 
have been argued in terms of war and state relations, civil-military relations, political 
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economy, and bureaucratic politics. The level of analysis will not exceed the domestic 
level to the individual level in this case, although the prolonged peace has obvious 
impacts over the individual leaders and the society as the constituents. 
1. Assessment of the Political Civil-Military Dimension 
In a democratic regime, the political-military dimension of civil-military relations 
is examined through the separation of power within the state among executive, 
legislative, and judiciary branches. It is hard to evaluate the state of civil-military 
relations in a non-democratic or authoritarian regime, where the military controls the 
power sources of the state, and does not allow civilian political opposition. However, we 
can still make arguments to analyze the deterioration of relations between civilians and 
military officials. 
The reason for the military to intervene into politics was due to the internal 
insecurity of the country rather than an emergency in terms of external aggression. 
Arguably, the lack of tangible external threats allowed the military to focus on domestic 
considerations. After gaining the authority to rule the country, the military regime utilized 
repressive measures to counter domestic insecurity and prioritized the economic growth, 
in a sense to legitimize the military rule. Insurgencies from 1967 through 1973 were 
successfully defeated and the scope of the state in the economy grew considerably with 
the deepening of Brazil's industrial base. Growth rates exceeded 11 percent a year 
between 1968 and 1973 helping to legitimize military rule.64 
Although the military officials continued to emphasize the external threats, 
especially from Argentina and the Communist Bloc, the real threat environment was not 
very tangible. Therefore, the real threat environment rather than the perceptional views of 
the generals allowed the authoritarian regime to deal with economic development beside 
internal security problems. 
2. Economic Boom and Decline of the Military Regime 
In the early years of the military regime, the military governments curbed civil 
liberties and suppressed the opposition from its opponents. The military government 
implemented the “Institutional Act” which empowered the military regime against all 
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political and public oppositions. The military government achieved an economic boom in 
the early 1970s after fighting with inflation through harsh wage controls and improved 
tax-collecting measures. The economic developments of authoritarian Brazil were even 
admired by other Latin American Militaries. 
The military’s temporary success can be attributed mainly to gathering idle 
sources together more efficiently. Success began to fade away as further expertise and 
dedication were needed in the second phase economic reforms in late 1970s and early 
1980s. Brazil has failed to supply a consistent social and economic wealth for its people 
where inequalities prevailed among people and among the regions of the country. The 
interior territories and the Amazon region have been underdeveloped which increased 
their vulnerabilities to isolation and unrest.65 The violations of human rights and liberties 
were severely criticized among the Western World. Not only were the business elite and 
foreign investors unsatisfied in the later periods of the military regime, but also the 
military itself began to question their roles and missions. 
3. Transition to Democracy 
The Brazilian transition to democracy from the authoritarian military regime 
began with the presidency of General Ernesto Geisel in 1974. Geisel and his closest 
political adviser, General Golbrey do Couto e Silva initiated a controlled liberalization 
(abertura) society. However, the process of democratic transition prolonged until the 
1989 presidential elections, despite the governmental elections in 1982 and the first 
civilian president in 1985. According to Linz and Stepan, the reason for the sixteen-year 
democratic transition in Brazil was due to the “political economy of legitimacy,” citizen’s 
perception of the socioeconomic efficacy of a regime, and the poor political party 
structure at that time.66 
After going through a series of negotiations with the civilians, the military 
secured its autonomy and constitutional guarantees to some extent. The economic 
fragility of the nation and the dependency of the first civilian administration under 
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President Sarney to the military for political legitimacy favored the military dominance in 
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III. DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS 
(1985-2005) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The civilian governments after the end of military rule in 1985 will be examined 
in this chapter. In the same methodology with the previous chapter, the civilian rule in 
Brazil will be analyzed in four parts in international and domestic levels of analysis. In 
the first part, the Post Cold War security environment in Latin America, particularly 
around Brazil in the Southern Cone, will be examined at the international level. In this 
part, arguments of “stable peace” and democratization, economic integration and Brazil’s 
national security are the main themes of the period between 1985 and 2005. In the second 
part, civilian threat perception and national security strategy will be determined in respect 
to the real threat environment. The major civilian perspective, in contrast to the military, 
prioritizes the economic threats instead of military defense issues. The third part 
examines the use of diplomacy in foreign relations of Brazil, where economic integration 
and national development have become the main policy objectives for the civilian 
governments. Finally, in the fourth part, the domestic implications of “prolonged peace” 
in Brazil will be extracted. The evolution of the civil-military relations in the domestic 
realm affirms the civilian dominance over military views under the absence of serious 
external threats. 
B. LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND BRAZIL 
1. Post Cold War Environment 
Authors like M. Arie Kacowicz, K. Holsti, and Andrew Hurrell find South 
America in the last decades as a “zone of peace”, at least a negative peace, instead of a 
zone of “violent peace” as David Mares articulates. South America is becoming more 
stable in terms of interstate conflicts, where the attempts for disarmament, organizations 
for regional stability and peace and transition to democracy are the indicators of stable 
peace in the region. Interamerican relations in the last two decades have displayed a clear 
decline in the expectations of hostile border crossings even among those chronic rivals of 
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the past. Today, virtually all Latin American governments are democratic and are willing 
to generate better conditions for cooperation in the region.67 
In respect to the imminent impacts of the end of the Cold War, Augusto Vargas 
argues that Latin America had not been decisively involved in Cold War except from 
1952 to 1960. Therefore, the end of Cold War did not fundamentally affect the defense 
policies and interests of countries in the region.68 Moreover, with the spread of 
democracy in the 1980s, the end of the Cold War, and, consequently, the relaxation of US 
security fears about this region, South America has received even lesser attention from 
the world due to not posing any threat.69  
On the other hand, the “ideological détente” after Cold War allowed Latin 
America not to be in a position to take sides in the East-West conflicts regardless of their 
own national interests. The inward-looking domestic development model within the 
bipolar international setting has been replaced with a more extroverted course.70 The 
acceleration of international, economic and political interactions, or simply the 
globalization in the world, has affected all levels of politics and societies in the region. 
Democratization and political freedom, international markets, communication, and 
social-economic development have become the issues of political affairs.71 
South America has become an area free from nuclear weapons with low indexes 
of military expenditures. However, Latin America is not completely free from threats and 
apparently, it is not yet a full zone of peace. The unilateral US involvement in the region, 
in terms of military power, is still a big security concern in the region. Moreover, 
domestic difficulties of overcoming economic inefficiency and spreading democratic 
consolidation are the current challenges for the legitimacy of the civilian governments. 
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2. Explanations for Peace in Latin America  
During the last fifty years, every country in South America has at least one 
significant period of military rule.72 As recently as 1978, more than half of the region 
lived under military rule. Since then, beginning with Ecuador and Peru, civilian 
governments replaced military regimes in country after country. Today no military 
governments remain.73 South American borrowed the “Zone of Peace” concept from 
Australia and New Zealand in an effort to keep the Cold War from undermining regional 
security in the 1980s.74 Political power of the armed forces has been significantly reduced 
and arms-control has been popular in the region since the 1990s. 
Some theories of peace find the war-peace pattern of this region related to a weak 
state phenomenon.75 However, this approach does not entirely cover the real nature of 
interstate relations among South American states. For the realist literature, a zone of 
peace is more likely to be maintained with the existence of a regional hegemon, a 
regional balance of power, a common third party threat, and/or an isolation of countries 
in the region. However, neither the unequal balance of power nor the regional hegemonic 
attitudes shaped the recent decades of South America. There was a potential hegemon in 
the region of Brazil, similar to the other parts of the world. It has the largest territory, the 
greatest population, and economic strength among all the states in the region. However, 
during the twentieth century Brazil has never behaved like a hegemon in the continent 
and been a threat for its neighbors.76 Also, the arguments of common third party threats 
and the geographic isolation of the countries in the region are not sufficient when we 
consider the relaxation of international relations in Post Cold War era and the rapid 
globalization via technologic developments, especially in the area of communication. 
From the liberal point of view, regional peace has the prerequisites of regional 
democracy, economic development, economic interdependence, transnational links and a 
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normative consensus regarding the rules of international law for regional conflicts. 
Liberal approaches claim that existences of these qualifications contribute to a sustained 
regional peace.77 However, the historical pattern of prolonged peace goes beyond the 
democratic governments. Even the authoritarian regimes contributed to the peaceful trend 
of South America in the twentieth century. 
3. Transition to Democracy in Brazil 
During the final years of the military regime (1979-85), due to the global and 
domestic trends at that time, the democratic transition became almost inevitable. The 
military knew its legitimacy nationally and internationally depended entirely on the 
continuation of economic growth. However, the economic miracle of the 1960s and 
1970s disappeared in the early 1980s, and the opposition began to face the dictatorship.78 
The civilian groups and elites with the support of moderate fraction within the military 
began to negotiate to end the authoritarian regime in Brazil at the turn of 1980s. The 
redemocratization process began during the years of President Geisel (1974-79). After 
several false starts, President Joao Figueiredo (1979-85) managed to deliver the promise 
of direct elections in 1982. For the first time since 1965, Brazil directly elected all its 
state governors in November 1982. However, the transition, started in 1974, took almost 
16 years until the first direct presidential election since 1960 was held on 15 November 
1989.79 
4. Brazil’s Security in the Post-Cold War Era 
The new Constitution of 1988 has coincided with the ending process of Cold War 
in Brazil under the first civilian president Jose Sarney (1985-1990). One of the major 
aims of the new constitution was to eliminate and redefine the issues related to the 
previous military governments. The laws and strategies, which were intended to structure 
Brazilian national security, were re-examined.80 The main external threats of the previous 
era, the communist ideology and the regional rivalry with Argentina, were replaced with 
                                                 
77 Kacowicz 1998, 86. 
78 Tracy Ann Breneman, Brazil’s Authoritarian Experience: 1964-1985; A Study of a Conflict 
(Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, September, 1995), 95. 
79 Skidmore and Smith 2001, 173. 
80 Ronaldo Lundgren, “A Brazilian Security Strategy” Strategy Research Project (USAWC, Pa, 
2002), 9. 
33 
the problems of economic development to heal the inflation, foreign depth, 
unemployment, social well-being through education, health care, internal security, and 
limited external threats, e.g. drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, and border 
security, in the Amazon region. 
Brazil has developed steadily into a stable and relatively prosperous country since 
the end of military rule in 1985. As the largest country in South America, it possesses 
much greater military resources than its neighbors do. Its borders to the north and west 
are very remote from the nation's population centers. The relations among the nations of 
the Platine Basin to the south are better than at any time in history. However, although 
facing very limited external threats, it remains vulnerable to periodic economic shocks, 
plus region-wide problems of institutionalized corruption, drug trafficking and violent 
crime. 
5. The Amazon and the Tri-Border Area 
Maintaining control over the vast Amazon region has become the most pressing 
issue of territorial defense for Brazilian military.81 Remote and sparsely populated 
northern and eastern frontiers allow for the more or less unhindered operation of 
transnational illegal operations. On the border with Colombia, the problem is real and the 
threat is immediate for Brazilians. The FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) 
guerrillas finance the war they are waging against the Colombian government by lending 
support to cocaine producers and traffickers. In 1985, the army announced the Northern 
Corridor (Calha Norte) project in an attempt to establish better control of Brazil's 
interests in the Amazon. The project has consisted of building a series of outposts along 
the Brazilian border with Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana.82 
Another security issue for Brazil’s new millennium context has been the tri-
border area between Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina. It has attracted increasing attention 
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since the “'war on terrorism” which has dominated the global agenda. Although Brazil 
does not fully share the concerns of U.S. about the tri-border area, Brazilian Intelligence 
Agency (ABIN) has paid attention to the area, where U.S. and Argentine intelligence 
services determined potential security vulnerabilities. In January 2003, General James 
Hill, head of US Southern Command, stated that Islamic terrorist groups such as Al-
Qaeda, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestinian Hamas and the Egyptian Al-Gama'a al-
Islamiya (Islamic Group) were operating in the area, although he provided no hard 
evidence of this.83 These people regularly remit money to relatives in Palestine, Syria, 
and other countries in the Middle East. Additionally, due to lassitude of Paraguayan laws 
and the ease of movement from one country to another, the region has become a sort of 
no-man's land in which contraband of every sort of merchandise, including drugs and 
arms, flow freely and large sums of money are laundered with relative ease. 
C. THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 
1. National Interests and Threats 
When examining the current threat perceptions by the government and the 
military, national interests are the core elements that illuminate the national security 
strategies. In Brazil, the national interests can be dealt within three titles: vital, important, 
and peripheral interests. The vital interests are sovereignty, protection of citizenry and 
national integrity, and development with social peace. Some more important interests are 
improving the democratic institutions, strengthening the free trade, contributing regional 
and international peace. Finally, the peripheral interests are increasing Brazil’s 
participation in the international decision-making process and greatness in the 
international order.84 
The 1988 Constitution clearly prohibits carrying out wars of conquest, and under 
the current policy guidance of national security, Brazil does not expect an interstate war 
with her neighboring countries. President Cardoso, in 1996, announced that Brazil enjoys 
a strategic “peace ring” because of Mercosur and the Amazonic Treaty of Cooperation. 
The peace, as a result, is due to many factors such as the peaceful historical tradition and 
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the current satisfaction with its borders, the power of the armed forces in the region to 
dissuade such conflicts, being ruled by a democratic regime and the interdependence 
brought with the adoption of a market economy.85 
On the other hand, despite the common sense about prolonged peace in the 
region, Brazil’s strategists also foresee some potential transnational threats for the 
country as well. Although there is no clear definition of a state actor to pose a threat to 
Brazil, there are some non-state actors that threaten the collective security in the region 
and inside Brazil, such as terrorism and organized crime embedded in drug trafficking, 
arm smuggling and money laundering. In the regional framework, Brazil evaluates the 
instability in the neighboring countries that can threaten Brazilian interests on the edge of 
the Brazilian Amazon.86 Brazil may be forced to become involved in conflicts originating 
elsewhere, due to threats to Brazil’s national heritage or vital interests. 
2. Post Cold War Environment and National Defense Strategy 
For Brazilians, South America is considered the most demilitarized region in the 
world, which is far away from the international rivalry and tensions. One of the major 
sources of their assessment is based on the re-democratizations that have taken place in 
the continent reducing the likelihood of conflicts. During the last decades, most regional 
disputes have been managed through peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms. 
The first National Defense Policy (NDP) document of the country was produced 
in November 1996, under President Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration, and the 
most recent document was produced in 1998.87 By definition, defense white papers are 
not only the primary source for the current administration, but also represent the 
historical legacy of unchanging national goals. Not all national aspirations and goals are 
explicitly expressed in these public sources; however, they are the aggregation of 
political, military, and social thoughts of decision makers in a given country. 
The document explicitly declares that Brazil has no territorial ambitions, rejects 
wars of conquest, gives priority to the peaceful solution of controversies, will use force 
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only as a source of self-defense and seeks close relations with its neighbors and the 
international community based on mutual confidence and respect.88 Brazil’s defense 
white book asserts, “Brazil has not been involved in a conflict with any of its neighbors 
for over a century, and it has worked to promote greater integration and closer relations 
among the nations in the Americas and, consequently, has gained international 
credibility.”89 
Brazilian authorities describe the uncertainties that characterize the Post Cold War 
international context and emphasize the importance of a national defense, which 
“continues to require diligence by national governments.” 90 With respect to the 
permanent national goals of Brazil, which seeks greatness in the international realm, the 
military authorities and civilian counterparts assess that “it is not realistic to imagine a 
nation-state of reasonable size and international influence that could forgo having a 
dependable defense force.”91 
Brazilian defense strategy aims to guarantee its sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
national interests, democratic institutions and the rule of law to protect Brazilian citizens, 
goods and resources, to promote Brazilian interests abroad, to project Brazil’s 
participation in international decision-making mechanisms and finally to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 92 In order to accomplish these 
objectives, the National Defense Policy outlines the directives for the related actors in the 
state. The main directive is to increase Brazil’s contribution in the international decision-
making processes through promoting international rule of law, a position in favor of 
global disarmament, participating in peacekeeping operations and expanding the regional 
integration. One relevant aspect of these directives is the participation of the Armed 
Forces in supportive activities in Brazil. These activities include civil defense, social and 
economic development and the protection of Brazilian Amazon with military presence.93 
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3. Economic Threats and the Amazon Region 
In regards to the changing international order in the post Cold War environment, 
the major priority of national security in Brazil was given to the economic and social 
development of the country. The economic liberalization adopted by Latin American 
countries in 1990s led to growing levels of economic, societal and political 
interdependence. This changed the countries’ mutual threat perceptions and created 
incentives for largely bilateral conflict prevention regimes. Today the main international 
policy issues of Brazil are listed as science and technology, disarmament, development, 
cultural diplomacy, human rights and social issues, environment, and drug-trafficking in 
which we can clearly see there is no concern about an external aggression.94 
Economic crises are considered the major contributor to the insecurity of 
Brazilian people. Risk of unemployment, possible return of inflation, a slow justice 
decision-making process, low quality level of education, strikes in essential public 
services and struggles to preserve consumer rights are the concerns of collective 
perception of insecurity.95 Considering that all political activity is ultimately accountable 
to the constituents in democratic regimes, in times of crisis, the population can apply 
severe pressure on political decisions by indirectly influencing the politicians. 
The protection and development of the Amazon region, which occupies more than 
half of Brazil's territory, has become another major national priority in Brazil. The 
military preserved its autonomy to protect and operate in the Amazon region during the 
transition to democracy and continue to be assertive in the region with projects such as 
development of the Amazon surveillance System (SIVAM) and “Calha Norte” Project 
(North Path Project).96 The military threat perception related to the Amazon region, such 
as illegal activities, underdevelopment, strikes and exploitation of the sources by external 
powers like US, is still an issue for national security strategy. Military strategists like 
General Alberto Cardoso, Chief of the Institutional Defense Cabinet and one of the 
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architects of the new national defense policy adopted by Fernando Henrique Cardoso's 
administration, explain the concerns of depopulation in the Amazon region and calls for 
combined efforts from all sectors of the country including the military and civil-society.97 
However, in contrast to the military perspectives, the civilians assess the international 
concerns for the tropical forests and follow policies more responsive to international 
concerns. 98 
D. FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
Brazilian strategic orientation is twofold, an “active diplomacy” pursuing peace 
and greatness in the world and “a deterrent posture of defensive character” to assure its 
sovereignty.99 Brazil strongly holds on to the principles of national sovereignty and non-
intervention in the Western Hemisphere, particularly from the United States. A second 
characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy is that Brazil aspires to be a world leader 
politically and economically.100 
There are some overlapping definitions for the foreign policy strategies pursued 
by Brazilian governments in the last decade: “Pax Americana” (South American Peace), 
“pacing and hedging”, and the “strategy of insertion” are among the major terms of the 
foreign affairs in Brazil. Tulchin defines Brazil’s foreign policy since the 1990s to be 
characterized by the acceptance of the core values and norms of the “Pax Americana” and 
by a drive towards a greater participation and acceptance of international institutions on 
the global, regional, sub regional and bilateral levels.101 He also argues that Brazil, facing 
the uncertainty of globalization, has adopted a strategy of “pacing and hedging”. In this 
perspective, Brazil prefers to move gradually and with caution in expanding regional 
cooperation in order to gain time to establish a general sense of unity and direction for the 
country and its neighbors in the international arena.102 By the term “strategy of insertion”, 
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which covers the acceptance of international regimes and norms, Tulchin stresses the 
preference of growing participation in UN operations, a wider participation in 
commercial multilateral negotiations and an emphasis on regional stability rather than 
sub regional competition. 
1. Diplomacy as the Major Policy Tool for Brazil 
After the 1980s, Brazil changed the foreign policy objectives connected with 
“high policy” concerning national security and military power than with objectives of 
“low policy”, regional commercial integration, or multilateral agreements. Brazilian 
National Defense Policy (1998), in accordance to its peaceful legacy, was built around an 
“active diplomacy devoted to peace, as well as a deterrent strategic posture.” 103 Today, 
Brazilian diplomacy is much more focused on international agreements, such as the 
Kyoto Protocol on climate change, rather than military issues, such as the 1952 military 
agreement with the US.104 
With the declining priority of the military defense strategies after the 1990s, 
Brazil found the opportunities to concentrate efforts in foreign policy to achieve national 
development and to overcome social inequalities. The major issues in the contemporary 
foreign affairs of Brazil have been globalization, Interamerican relations, bilateral 
relations with U.S. and contacts with overseas countries such as EU, China, Japan, India, 
and South Africa. 
2. Regional Relations 
In the Post Cold War era, Latin America shifted from an inward looking 
international model to more outward policies.105 Relations in the region have prospered 
with the regional institutions such as OAS, Mercosur, Rio Treaty and the non-
proliferation agreements. In the last decades after the end of military rule, Brazil has 
increased bonds with its neighbors in the Southern Cone and the Amazon Region. 
Mercosur in the south and the Amazon Cooperation Treaty with the neighbors in the 
Amazon region have strengthened the integration process and close relations. 
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Among Latin American nations, Brazil sees itself as the natural leader in the 
region. This can also be revealed through the figures of economic integration, especially 
in the Southern Cone, pointing Brazil as the major trader in the region. However, despite 
the mediating and leading role in the interstate and intrastate conflicts in the region, as 
well as economic integration, Brazil still seems reluctant to undertake the full-fledged 
leadership in Latin America. 
3. Relations with the United States 
The United States has a special position in the politics of all Latin American 
states. The special alliance between U.S. and Brazil endured only until the early 1960s. 
After this period, the United States was no longer the focal point for Brazilian foreign 
policy. Brazil generally opposed the interventionist policies of the U.S., but did not move 
further than mild objections, because of the fact that Brazil cannot bear the burdens of 
being the target of U.S assertiveness. Starting from the military years, the civilian 
administrations, with variations of intensity, clashed over a large number of issues 
including the management of the debt crisis, trade and investment issues (especially 
informatics and intellectual property rights), trade questions in the GATT, and 
environmental and Amazonian policies with The United States.106 
The current issue of Brazil’s foreign relations with the United States is about the 
negotiations of FTAA. Brazil prefers to develop a negotiation strategy that will result in 
postponing decisions on international or regional integration in order to provide more 
time for their economies to increase in competitiveness and adjust to the levels of their 
key partners. In response to the hesitancy of Brazil, U.S. wants to increase its bilateral 
trade surplus and political consequences of the integration.107 Another example of 
Brazil’s diplomatic challenge to the U.S. was after the “global war on terror” when U.S. 
launched strict measures for foreigners coming to the U.S. Brazil responded with the 
fingerprinting and photographing of US citizens visiting Brazil since 1 January 2004 as a 
retaliatory measure for the implementation of the US-VISIT programme.108 
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4. Relations Outside the Region 
The civilian governments, particularly the last two administrations under Cardoso 
and Lula, have been seeking opportunities to increase the economic relations with 
alternative countries instead of relying solely on developed economies such as US and 
EU. South Africa, Japan, India, and the EU are the focus areas of bilateral contacts of 
Brazilian foreign policy outside the region. Foreign policy under President Lula has 
shown a more independent and self-confident Brazil, more critical of the US, and 
pursuing a more aggressive trade policy to defend national and regional interests. This 
has included the forming of new alliances with other neutral emerging powers such as 
China, India and South Africa as well as deepening those with states such as Russia and 
the Ukraine, and seeking new trade links with the Middle Eastern states.109 
According to 2002 record, after U.S. and Argentina, Netherlands, China, 
Germany, and Japan are the principal trading partners for Brazil.110 Brazil became a key 
member of a new axis of powerful developing nations known as BRICS, formed by 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. These countries have a combined 
population of nearly three billion people, about half the world's total, and the continuing 
economic growth, particularly in China and India, has made these economies very large 
in terms of absolute size.111 
The relations with the Portuguese speaking African countries developed with the 
consolidation of the South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation have also contributed 
to the “ring of peace” around Brazil in terms of external affairs. Currently, Brazil is also 
involved in technical-military co-operation with the Community of Portuguese Speaking 
Countries (CPLP): Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, 
São Tomé and Príncipe, and East Timor.112 Moreover, by joining the UN peacekeeping 
operations in Angola, Mozambique, and most recently East Timor, who share some 
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similar cultural and linguistic heritage with Brazil, Brazil sees the opportunity to fill a 
leadership void in the Portuguese-speaking world. 
E. DOMESTIC REALM AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN BRAZIL 
Frederick Nunn claims that the state-military relations and the rules are not the 
same after the contemporary global environment; therefore, they have to be redefined 
accordingly.113 How has the change in the international environment affected Brazilian 
civil-military relations between 1985 and 2005? In order to answer this question, the state 
of CMR in Brazil and the impacts of the threat environment are analyzed. 
In the new era of civilian politics in Brazil, the lack of external threat has been 
more obvious unlike during the military rule before 1985. After reining the power, the 
civilian authority prioritized the economic, industrial and social developments rather than 
defense and national security concerns. 
1. Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Brazil Since 1985 
The military formally left power in 1985, but Brazil’s transition had begun a 
decade earlier, during the presidency of General Ernesto Geisel (1974-79). Despite its 
growing loss of support among the business sector, the regime did not face broad, united 
opposition to its rule until the economic situation deteriorated in early 1980s.114 The 
cooperative politics with neighboring countries, especially with Argentina during late 
1970s and early 1980s, the diminishing threat of communism and changing preferences 
of elites in Brazil altered the threat perceptions of the key actors in the politics of Brazil. 
The first civilian, President Jose Sarney (1985-1990), in the crisis environment, 
heavily relied on the military for political support. Therefore, the combination of 
extensive military autonomy and the weakness of civilian institutions, right after the 
transition to democracy, contributed to the continuation of the military influence. The 
military preserved its constitutional mission as the guarantor of law and order. The 
civilian authority could not manage to restrict the military tasks to external defense and 
failed to find a civilian defense ministry. One of the major debates under the first civilian 
administration was about the elimination of the National Security Council. President 
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Sarney decreed the creation of a Secretariat of National Defense, which would exercise 
the same powers as a Security Council. Moreover, the technological and industrial 
interests of the military were successfully preserved in the Constitution.115 Enduring 
control of the defense sector has provided the military enhanced political influence on a 
broad range of issues.116 According to Hunter, “the absence of an electoral mandate 
weakened Sarney’s capacity to challenge such a historically powerful institution.”117 
These early patterns seen in the first civilian government have changed with the 
successive governments. Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992) aggressively attacked 
military prerogatives including slashing the budget and privatizing major defense 
industries. He worked for nuclear disarmament of the military due to the intense 
international pressures.118 However, his impeachment in 1992 slowed the momentum of 
his military reform policies. His vice president and successor, Itamar Franco (1992-
1994), lacked the political influence to carry out Collor’s reforms. 
In 1994, Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was elected President in 
Brazil and made economic development the number one priority of his administration. 
He played a delicate balancing game with the military, attempting to exert civilian control 
while appeasing the military financially. Although disbanding the National Security 
Council and National Intelligence Service, and reducing the defense budget cuts of the 
traditional influence means of military, the military still remained as an important veto 
power in the government’s major policy shifts.119 
The constitutional design of ministerial power favoring military has been changed 
in 1999 with the foundation of a new Ministry of Defense under a civilian minister. With 
the approval of the new Ministry by the Brazilian Senate on June 1999, the military 
ministers became service branch commanders and lost their cabinet-level status. 
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Another important issue in civil-military dimension is the role of armed forces in 
guiding the course of Amazonian development. The “soft” border and lack of state 
infrastructure have rendered the military an important factor in the region. Growing 
international concern since the early 1980s for the rain forest and its indigenous 
populations, and the advent of democracy in 1985, have introduced serious challenges to 
the military’s ability to continue dominating the formulation of policies affecting 
Amazonia.120 
2. The Current State of Civil-Military Relations 
The current state of civil- military relations in Brazil is not unambiguously 
defined by the scholars. Some scholars like Wendy Hunter supports the idea that the 
military influence is destined to fade in the new environment after 1985. According to 
Hunter, “democratically elected politicians have successfully contested the military over 
a broad range of issues and narrowed its sphere of political influence.”121 Hunter argues 
that the military prerogatives are less influential and privileged than they were in the 
initial period of the civilian rule.122 Such prerogatives are the positions in National 
Security Council and National Information Agency, a continuing role in the management 
of strategic industries such as informatics and telecommunications, a predominant voice 
involving nuclear issues, a developing occupation of the Amazon, retention of some 
influence over militarized state police and protection from legislative oversight in areas 
such as military intelligence. 
However, Jorge Zaverucha claims the opposite view, that the military influence in 
Brazil remained strong in spite of democratic reforms due to the constitutional guarantees 
about the military roles. Article 142 of the Brazilian constitution defines the military as 
the “guardian of constitutional powers, of the law, and of public order.”123 Zaverucha 
presents the continued role of the military in internal affairs, such as domestic 
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intelligence and police operations, as evidence. Brazilian military has maintained a large 
number of internal missions, especially the expanding mission in the Amazon region. 
The actual state of CMR in Brazil is distinctly between these two extreme ends 
and it varies according to the area. The military influence continued during the very first 
years of transition to democracy through the defense industry and security related 
policies. As the governments have become less depended on military for political 
support, the civilian assertiveness increased against military prerogatives. 
The absence of regional and international threats seems to contribute to Brazil’s 
CMR in some areas such as the foundation of a civilian defense ministry and the 
elimination of the National Security Agency and National Intelligence Agencies under 
military dominance. However, in accordance with Desch’s argument, the lack of a 
serious external threat hindered the civilian leaders’ expertise in defense and security 
issues, which are left to military autonomy. The lack of interest in defense and security 
strategies and industries among the government institutions and the society helped the 
military to preserve its influence in politics. Militaries, which have exclusive control over 
state revenues or industries, are more difficult to control than when the armed forces 
control internal security agencies. With this in mind, it is difficult to prevent military 
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IV. COMPARISON AND THE CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I will try to compare the politics of the military regime from 1964-
85 and the civilian regime after 1985, in terms of Brazil’s peaceful security environment. 
In the previous chapters, the authoritarian Brazil and the civilian democracy have been 
examined within four dimensions: the international environment, threat perception, 
foreign policy, and domestic policies. The same dimensions will be analyzed to assess the 
implications of prolonged peace under different threat perceptions. Following the 
comparison of two periods, in the conclusion, the future role of the Brazilian military, 
whether focused internally or externally, will be discussed. 
Below is table for the variables and major themes of our comparison. 
Table 1 Variables of Comparison 




Type of Peace 
(International level) 
- CW bipolar system in the world 
- Violent or armed peace in Latin 
America 
- No external aggression against Brazil 
- PCW multipolarity and U.S. 
hegemony in the world 
- Stable Peace in South 
America 






- Argentina rivalry and nuclear programs 
(external threat) 
- Communist subversion and ideological 
divisions (internal security) 
- Socio-economic problems and 
development 
- National security state and 
militarization 
- Economic threats and 
dependency 
- Non-traditional threats and 
organized crime 
- Development and protection 
of the Amazon Region 
- National security documents 
and new priorities 
Foreign Policy and 
Diplomacy 
(international level) 
- Military and political diplomacy 
- Extra-regional relations and U.S.  




- Regional Integration 
- Alternative trade partners 





- National Security State and internal 
missions of the military 
- Military role driven by threat 
perception 
- Transition to democracy 
- Dominance of civilian views 
- Economic-social 
development 
- Democratic consolidation 
and eroding military privileges 
in policy making process  
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B. LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY AND BRAZIL 
By any consideration, definition and explanation of conflict and peace, it is a 
common conclusion that South America has for the most part been a very peaceful nation 
throughout this century. No other region in the world possessed as many bilateral and 
multilateral documents, treaties, and charters imposing obligations for peaceful 
settlements of disputes as South American States did during this time period. Arbitral 
procedures for resolving conflicts have been used at extraordinarily high rates compared 
to other regions of the world. A recent study states that there are eight peaceful territorial 
changes in South America since 1900 and only two territorial conflicts were resolved by 
war. From the 1820s until 1970, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Venezuela used arbitration procedures 151 times.124 
1. Military Years 
The military years witnessed the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War. Brazil felt the impacts of the bipolar system in the societal 
arena through ideological conflicts, but not in its interstate relations. However, except for 
the peak of nuclear rivalry in the 1960s involving Central America, Latin American states 
were not on the spot for the most part of the Cold War. The legacy of not having major 
interstate wars in the region since the turn of twentieth century has prevailed among Latin 
America during the military years in Brazil. Argentina’s nuclear rivalry and the 
communist subversion in Brazil were the two potential threats for Brazil in this period. 
Moreover, the economic problems and underdevelopment were also main concerns on the 
onset of the military rule. The security environment for Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s 
was not as fragile and suspicious as David Mares articulates for authoritarian Latin 
America. Therefore, we can evaluate the external security environment for authoritarian 
Brazil as a continuation of century long peaceful tradition in Brazil’s interstate relations, 
especially in the 1980s when the security dilemma in Argentine relations began to fade 
away. 
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2. Civilian Years 
After 1985 in Brazil and after the end of the Cold War in Latin America, the 
interstate relations became more cooperative and peaceful. The Region possessed the 
qualifications of zones of peace, as Kacowicz examines the Inter-American relations, 
particularly for the last half of the twentieth century. Latin America’s importance, in 
terms of global competitions of world powers, has been reduced in the Post Cold War 
system. Countries within the region gained the opportunity to pursue their economic and 
national interests, instead of taking sides between western and eastern blocs. The third 
wave of democracy changed the military regimes and their “national security state” 
ideologies with the primacy of social and economic development. 
Brazil joined the global and regional trend of democratization even during the last 
military government in late 1970s and early 1980s. The external security environment for 
Brazil under the civilian regimes has been free from tangible threats, in contrast to the 
previous era of nuclear and ideological competition. The economic threats and social 
inequality, organized crime, and the development of the Amazon Region became major 
concerns of national security. The conflictual issues with Argentina, nuclear proliferation 
and Itaipú conflict, were solved in the late 1980s. After the 1990s, Brazil’s economic 
integration, Mercosur and SAFTA, with South American countries and the alternative 
relationships with extra regional countries in Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Europe 
strengthened the “ring of peace” around Brazil under civilian governments. 
C. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS 
Defining the national security priorities of Latin American countries shaped by 
threat perception is an important variable in our analysis. Most of the time, the perceived 
threats, rather than the real type or levels of the threats, are more influential in policy-
making processes. 
1. Military Regimes 
The military governments in the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America exploited the 
term “national security” in their countries. The ambiguity in the definition of national 
security, strategic policies, and threat perceptions allowed the military to play a big role 
during the military regimes after 1964. The military was keeping the civilians out of 
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defense policy formulation, and the civilians were not adept at dealing with security 
issues due to lack of professionalism and interest. 
Geography has always been a strong component of Brazil's national security 
policy, and the same geopolitical thinking influenced the threat perception when the 
military was in charge in Brazil. The incalculable resources of Brazil, e.g. the fresh water 
in the Amazon, were in danger of external attacks and exploitation. Moreover, the 
communist ideology, isolating intentions of her Spanish-speaking neighbors, nuclear 
aggressions from Argentina, dependency on global economies, and U.S. hegemony in 
Brazil’s sphere of interests were among the security agenda items of the military regimes. 
The strategy of the military leaders in response to the perceived threats had four 
basic elements. These elements are improving national defense capabilities, particularly 
through weapon modernization and war industry, keeping the status quo with Argentina 
and improving bilateral economic contacts, giving a special emphasis to the relationship 
with the United States, and extending the relations and ties with Bolivia and Paraguay in 
the La Plata basin.125 Brazil’s strategy required both military and diplomatic relations in 
its foreign policies. In contrast to the actual state of external threats against Brazil, the 
military threat perceptions put Brazil in a position to linger between prolonged peace and 
armed-peace in international relations. The security concerns, however, changed in the 
later years of the military regimes in accordance with the real threat environment. 
2. Civilian Regimes 
In Latin America, the traditional national security perceptions changed with the 
rise of democratization and the economic opening in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
governments realized the benefits of cooperation rather than military competition with 
their neighbors. Unlike the clarity of threats within a bipolar system, contemporary 
international systems brought the ambiguity of a solid external threat. Countries became 
more preoccupied with the perceived threat to national security presented by growing 
social inequality, poverty, and ethnic divisions. The new environment brought the need to 
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balance the security concerns of states with the aspirations of populations towards social 
well-being.126 
In Brazil, the civilians officially took over the government in 1985, but practically 
the civilian elites began to impose their threat perceptions in national security strategies 
in the second civilian government elected in 1990. After the 1990s, as the threat 
perception altered with the changes in the international realm, the civilian authority could 
break the dominance of geopolitical military thinking in security policies. 
The new Brazilian Constitution, promulgated in 1988, reflects changed 
perceptions for the national security policy, and guides the policy-makers. Security has 
become more complex than merely military provisions in the Post-Cold War era. The 
civilian governments wisely developed a strategy of sustainable national defense policy 
based on socio-economic development needs of the country, rather than a one-
dimensional perception of the country’s prospective military requirements.127 The social 
and economic inequalities, inflation, organized crime, and instability of the neighboring 
countries continued to concern civilians. When compared, with the military perceptions, I 
believe, the civilian security agenda seems more harmonious with the real external threats 
against Brazil. 
D. CHANGE IN FOREIGN RELATIONS 
The national security prerogatives and changing foreign relations are the main 
indicators of our comparison for the military and civilian rule in Brazil. Brazil as a nation 
has always strived to achieve greatness and recognition in world politics, this yearning 
continues to drive Brazilian foreign policy in the 21st century.128 This traditional 
orientation influenced the national strategies of both military and civilian elites. In many 
cases, aspects of competitive and non-cooperative nature of Brazilian foreign policy and 
national security have reflected the aspirations to become a leading country in the world. 
Brazil’s protective attitudes over the Amazon and challenging stance against American 
hegemony, supporting a larger defense industry, and Brazil’s attempts to gain a 
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permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council are the indicators of this 
orientation.129 
Brazil developed a diplomatic culture based on the peaceful resolution of 
disputes, in favor of mediation and negotiation. Brazil has not taken on a hegemonic 
responsibility for South American events, nor has it carried out overt interventions or 
made pronouncements on internal affairs of neighboring states. In its external affairs, 
Brazil refused to assume roles such as continental hegemony or the Third World 
leadership against world powers. Concentration on internal political liberalization and 
economic recovery hindered a larger role for Brazil in the recent past, but, at the same 
time, further lessened local suspicions about hegemonic pretensions.130 
1. Military Rule 
Brazil perceived a high level of external threat in the 1960s and 1970s, then 
shifted its policies in accordance with the low level of external threats in the 1980s. 
Despite the early geopolitical perceptions about the external threats, the national security 
strategies of the military governments prioritized the economic development and internal 
security rather than external defense. The military regime kept diplomatic dialogue open 
and promoted the image of Brazil as a trustworthy partner. Brazil tried to avoid 
international frictions and stay out of others’ conflicts during the military regime, where 
the international context itself made cooperative relations favorable for Brazil. 
2. Civilian Rule 
After 1985, Brazil continued to be a moderate status-quo power on political issues 
and was more focused on economic development. One of the biggest indicators of a 
major foreign policy change in Brazil was relations with Argentina. The Argentina and 
Brazilian relationship changed after 1980 from conflict to cooperation. This development 
represents a change in mindset from the feelings of suspicion and competition that 
characterized the pre-1980 era, where historically aggressive geopolitical theories 
dominated the politics. Due to either the end of military rule or the economic necessities 
of the era, it is clear that the international threat environment played an important 
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conditional role for cooperative foreign relations, and Brazil will probably continue its 
integration in the Southern Cone. 
E. DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The impacts of the external context on domestic and bureaucratic spheres are not 
easy to extract. However, the overall examination of the internal policy debates in Brazil, 
focused on economic and social development rather than defense issues, reflects some 
clues about the implications of a peaceful interstate position. Moreover, the level of civil-
military relations in Brazil provides an understanding of who makes the policy decisions 
and the consequences of these decisions. 
1. Authoritarian Brazil 
Brazil experienced relatively low levels of external threats in the 1960s and 1970s 
and arguably in the 1980s, despite perceived threats from Communism and Argentina. 
Even under the military rule between 1964 and 1985, the armed forces restricted their 
own budget in favor of an intensive public investment programme for civilian 
industrialization.131 The new international order, the economic and social globalization, 
and the increasing interdependence among the countries in the world affected the 
Brazilian politics beginning in the 1980s. During the last years of the military rule in 
Brazil, the trend was towards a democratic government prioritizing the economic and 
social development of the country instead of focusing on threat possibilities. 
The external and internal threats perceived by the military governments were used 
as reasons to avoid the political opposition from civilians. The political opposition and 
civil liberties were curbed by the authoritarian rule until the 1980s in Brazil. Moreover, 
the economic miracle achieved by the military governments in mid the 1970s assured the 
duration of a military presence in politics, but their inefficiency in further addressing 
economic needs of the country in late the 1970s and early 1980s shifted political 
alliances. The civilian elites, the businessmen, and the emerging middle-class began to 
speak out for a regime change, whereas the military regime itself also initiated some 
liberalization efforts in public policies in the late 1970s. 
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2. Democratic Brazil 
The end of the military rule was not only a result of changing threat environments 
inside and outside Brazil, but also a causal factor for the establishment of new foreign 
and domestic policies. The military government gave up the power in 1985; however, the 
military as an institution preserved a considerable amount of influence after intense 
negotiations with the first civilian government under President Sarney. In the later 
presidencies, strengthening the civilian control over military in Brazil can be associated 
to the changing international environment and threat perceptions. After the 1980s, the 
civilian governments were able to prioritize social and economic developments rather 
than obeying the military prerogatives. 
Civilian governments ended the armed forces’ previous monopoly on decisions 
affecting national security and defense, through national security institutions, intelligence 
services, defense industries, and strategic nuclear programs.132 President Collor abolished 
the military-dominated intelligence service and Security Council in 1990. He signed an 
agreement with Argentina allowing inspections by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency and endorsed measures to curb ecological devastation and protect indigenous 
populations in the Amazon, opposing the military’s strong interest in developing the 
region. President Cardoso founded the Ministry of Defense in 1999 and disbanded 
previous ministerial positions of the armed services. I agree with Hunter’s main argument 
that the electoral incentives and the popular support enhanced the civilians’ capacity to 
do so.133 
3. Brazil’s Military Role in the Future 
Since the Second World War, the traditional role of the militaries as an instrument 
of a state’s territorial expansion has changed.134 Military leaders, having difficulties to 
point out tangible external enemies, argue that defense is like insurance until the need 
arises. However, in a setting where economic resources are tight and scarce, politicians 
are reluctant to allocate funds for such vague potential contingencies. Electoral incentives 
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motivate politicians to search for economic assets to distribute as political pork barrel, 
where defense expenditures in Brazil yield little electoral capital. 
Today in Brazil, one of the major issues in domestic affairs is the role of the 
armed forces in relation to the actual external threat environment. Will the military in 
Brazil focus solely on external missions such as preparing for an external war and 
multinational peacekeeping operations, or will the military be preoccupied with internal 
security such as anti-drug operations, fighting organized crime, and development of 
Amazon region? The end of the Cold War, the absence of border conflicts, and the 
peaceful international context allowed the military to be more involved in internal 
missions in Brazil. State military police and military fire brigades are still controlled by 
the army.135 However, there is still reluctance within the military and democratization 
efforts on the civilian side for avoiding the internal focus of the military. 
Brazil is a nation that developed the capacity to make nuclear weapons and then 
appeared to abandon its weapons programme. Brazil's nuclear capabilities are the most 
advanced in Latin America, having a dependable raw material base for developing 
nuclear power engineering, highly skilled scientific specialists, technologies for enriching 
uranium, and several nuclear research centers.136 
My general assessment is that Brazil will not undermine its military capability 
while exploiting the peaceful environment in the region. Whatever the international 
environment is, military capacity will always stay in the core of national strategies of the 
countries. No economic and social improvement can absolutely guarantee the 
sustainability of the security environment, unless supported with military power. 
However, for Brazil, given the state of the Brazilian armed forces, significant hard power 
is not available at present, and economic power is the primary source of influence in 
Brazil’s foreign affairs. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The reasons to examine the military rule and civilian rule separately were to 
compare different threat perceptions under mainly similar external threat environments, 
the lack of interstate wars in our case, and to answer whether the regional peace enhanced 
or hindered Brazil’s national goal of greatness. In Latin America, the institutionalization 
of the pre-existing peaceful environment in the 1990s, was not only a result of changing 
threat perceptions under democratic regimes, but also a reason itself to change Brazilian 
policies towards further economic and security cooperation with its neighbors. I argue 
that the absence of hostile behaviors in South America increased the benefits of more 
cooperative foreign policies in Brazil in both security and economic based relations. 
However, the peaceful international environment hindered long-term state capacity of 
Brazil who has hegemonic aspirations in the region and the world. The peaceful relations 
enhance the socio-economic development, but, at the same time, may undermine the 
military power that maintains keeps its dominance in the international arena. 
We can list four intervening factors in the relationship between prolonged peace 
and policy outcomes in Brazil. First, the prolonged peace changed the threat perceptions 
of the ruling elite, and the political scene brought the elites who are more interested in 
economics concerns, rather than world politics. Second, the security environment in the 
region did not generate the opportunist conditions for Brazil to be more assertive. 
Generally, Latin America has been unassertive in projecting any importance in the global 
system beyond economics, and posed no threat to nation-states dominating the 
international politics. Third, absence of a robust external threat limited the scope and the 
cohesion of the state in Brazil. Along with a narrower scope and lesser levels of state 
cohesion, Brazil hindered the success of their influence strategies. Finally, the peaceful 
environment helped Brazil to get rid of its security dilemma with its neighbor Argentine, 
and gave way to a fast economic development without heavy military expenses. 
However, abandoning the nuclear armament, and advanced military technologies due to 
the needlessness of a strong military force deprived Brazil of a strong policy tool in the 
world politic: hard power. 
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